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Abstract
This paper outlines a number of key lessons learned from an investigation into the techniques malicious
executable software can employ to hinder digital forensic examination. Malware signature detection has been
recognised by researchers to be far less than ideal. Thus, the forensic analyst may be required to manually
analyse suspicious files. However, in order to hinder the forensic analyst, hide its true intent and to avoid
detection, modern malware can be wrapped with packers or protectors, and layered with a plethora of antianalysis techniques. This necessitates the forensic analyst to develop static and dynamic analysis skills tailored to
navigate a hostile environment. To this end, the analyst must understand the anti-analysis techniques that can be
employed and how to mitigate them, the limitations of existing tools and how to extend them, and how to employ
an appropriate analysis methodology to uncover the intent of the malware.
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INTRODUCTION
Malicious software (malware) can be considered as any software which has a malicious intent or effect (Aycock,
2006). This goes beyond consideration of viruses, worms, bots, trojans and similar categorizations of malware
that attack computers on an almost indiscriminate basis. It extends to malware tailored to attack an individual or
organisation to extract confidential information. Research shows that malware signature detection is far less than
ideal and is limited to recognition of malware that has already been extensively analysed (Chouchane,
Walenstein, & Lakhotia, 2007; Masood, 2004). It is very unlikely that a signature will exist to detect customised
malware that will be of benefit to the forensic analyst in the field. In such cases, the analyst may be required to
conduct static and dynamic analysis to determine the intent of the malware. However, an extensive variety of
anti-analysis techniques exists to hinder the analyst from analysing the malware. Modern malware incorporates
stealth techniques to hide it from the analyst, deception techniques to hide its true intent, and active techniques to
defeat common analysis tools in their default configurations (Grugq, 2003; Harbour, 2007; Rutkowska, 2006a,
2006b). Such techniques are commonly referred to as anti-forensics and are becoming a very important
consideration for the digital forensic analyst, as the majority of modern malware employs these analysis
avoidance techniques (Falliere, 2007; Ferrie, 2008; Yason, 2007). A simple reality is that detailed analysis often
cannot begin without mitigating these anti-analysis techniques.
It was reported in an online article that a speaker at the Australian IT Security in Government Conference
claimed that 65% of new malware employs these anti-forensics techniques to avoid detection before, during and
after an event (Kotadia, 2006). Further, anti-forensics has also been described as any attempt to hinder the
forensic process by negatively impacting available evidence (Rogers 2006). Anti-forensics is arguably becoming
a very important consideration for the digital forensic analyst. Malware is becoming increasingly stealthy and
more likely to incorporate deception to stay on the target of interest in an attempt to remain undetected. This
could be attributed to the substantial illicit financial gain that can be achieved from the employment of malware
(Larsson, 2007; Newman, 2006).

LESSONS LEARNED
This research had two main avenues of enquiry. The first was a study of the effectiveness of the analysis
avoidance techniques malware can employ, together with an investigation into how the use of these techniques
can be detected and mitigated. The most significant papers on the employment of these techniques present code
snippets of assembly language programs together with brief discussions on how the techniques can be mitigated

31 | P a g e

(Falliere, 2007; Ferrie, 2008; Yason, 2007). These same techniques were then incorporated by this research into
small, standalone assembly language programs so that the effectiveness of the techniques could be determined
using popular debugging tools in a series of quasi-experiments. All of the employed techniques were found to be
effective. Popular debuggers are able to be scripted to automate analysis of disassemblies and this can be useful
for static analysis. However, malware is often so heavily obfuscated, it must be allowed to run so that the
instructions and data are de-obfuscated at run time to be able to be read and analysed. Debuggers are also able to
be scripted to interact with the program at run time to assist in this endeavour. This feature is very useful in order
to detect and mitigate anti-forensic techniques. The second line of enquiry was to analyse network based
malware collected from a honeynet and examine how effective anti-virus (AV) software is at detecting malware
and also to examine the use of anti-forensic techniques employed by the malware. It was essentially found that
AV signature detection is less than ideal, and that the collected malware invariably contained anti-analysis
techniques. These avenues of enquiry resulted in a number of lessons learned, and the key lessons learned as a
result of this research are presented below.

Malware Signature Detection its Far Less Than Ideal
An examination of 738 malware specimens collected for the purposes of this research shows that even though
the majority of the malware collected had been observed in the field for periods of time approaching or even
exceeding one year, the unanimous detection by a collection of thirty six AV detection engines was only 10.4%.
The particular AV engine used by the Anubis (International Secure Systems Lab, Vienna University of
Technology, Eurecom France, & UC Santa Barbara, 2008) online virus analyser only recorded a 73.7% detection
rate of the samples as malicious. This is a significant and potentially alarming result as it indicates that even
though the use of AV software is considered mandatory for both personal and enterprise users, detection of all
malware could be highly unlikely. This supports the findings of other researchers (Masood, 2004; Mohandas,
n.d.; Skoudis & Zeltser, 2004; Szewczyk & Brand, 2008).

Presentation of a Taxonomy of Analysis Avoidance Techniques
A review of the literature uncovered an extensive range of techniques, mostly published by three key researchers
who each provide their own, slightly differing taxonomies of analysis avoidance techniques (Falliere, 2007;
Ferrie, 2008; Yason, 2007). Note that these papers have only been published within the past year or two of this
research and this could be indicative of the problems encountered by the increased spectrum of techniques
malware is now employing to hinder analysis. Their work is supplemented by other researchers whose online
articles focus on more individual techniques and provide greater detail with respect to implementation and
analysis (Anthracene, 2006; Gordon, n.d.; Rolles, 2007; Smidgeonsoft, 2005; Smith & Quist, 2006; xC, 2007).
The work of Rolles in particular focuses on leading edge techniques such as malware that uses its own virtual
machines to severely hinder detailed analysis. Such malware is difficult to analyse because the custom virtual
machines have their own instruction sets, and these customised instruction sets have to be determined before
detailed analysis can commence. A proposed taxonomy by the authors of this research combines elements of the
taxonomies of Falliere, Ferrie and Yason, and appears in
Table 1, in an attempt to provide a more complete coverage of techniques. Note that each technique listed in the
taxonomy is the highest level stratum and could be further stratified.

Analysis Avoidance Techniques are Very Effective
An extensive range of anti forensic techniques can be implemented in malware as indicated by
Table 1. The literature and search of reverse engineering web sites revealed more than 80 fundamental
techniques. Note that these techniques can have multiple variations and can be used in various combinations. A
number of these techniques were implemented in small standalone assembly language programs and tested
against popular analysis tools in a series of quasi-experiments. All of the techniques were found to be effective
against the tools in their default configurations. With the appropriate settings and/or with appropriate scripts or
plugins, these techniques could be detected and mitigated. However, significant analysis skills are still required
in order to successfully ascertain the modus operandi of each piece of malware.

Analysis Tools Have Deficiencies
A number of analysis tools are utilized by malware forensic analysts, with static and dynamic analysis
representing two significant methodologies that can be used to analyse malware (Aquilina, Casey, & Malin,
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2008). Software disassemblers and debuggers such as IDA Pro (Hex-Rays, 2008) and OllyDBg (Yuschuk, 2008)
can be used to perform a detailed analysis of the malware code and provide an internal view of the malwares
functionality (Valli & Brand, 2008). This is referred to as static analysis. In contrast, dynamic analysis runs the
malware and observes the interaction of the running malware with the computer from a behavioural point of
view. A number of plug-ins that extend the functionality of IDA Pro and OllyDBg include IDA Stealth (Newger,
2008) and Olly Advanced (MaRKuS, 2006) respectively to work with malicious code that employ anti-analysis
techniques. The intention of such plug-ins is to provide functionality to hide their associated tools
Table 1: A proposed taxonomy of techniques employed by malware in order to avoid analysis
Technique
Anti Emulation

Description
A range of techniques exist to detect that the malware is running inside
popular VM’s such as VMWare or Virtual PC.

Anti Online Analysis

A variety of techniques exist for malware to determine if it is running in
a specific online analysis engine such as Anubis or Norman Sandbox.

Anti Hardware

Techniques that target hardware such as the CPU including the debug
registers to determine if it is being debugged.

Anti Debugger

Target the way debuggers work and take advantage of these to take
control of the flow of execution. This gives malware the opportunity to
incorporate deception.

Anti Disassemblers

Target the way disassemblers work and take advantage of this to
produce a false disassembly.

Anti Tools

Detect the presence of specific analysis tools and enter a deceptive
mode.

Anti Memory
Target the way memory is used when a process is being debugged and
take advantage of this as well as the way processes can be dumped from
memory including the use of stolen bytes.
Anti Process
Target the way processes are handled when being debugged and take
advantage of this including structured exception handling.
Anti-Analysis
Target the way analysis is conducted. Use junk code, code camouflage,
check sum checks, destruction of the Import Address Table and other
deceptive techniques to make analysis harder.
Packers and Protectors

Use run time packers and protectors to obfuscate code and data and
make it hard to unpack to find the original entry point. This includes
packers that use their own virtual machines such as HyperUnpackme2.

Rootkits

Insert rootkits at Ring 0 to take control of the way the operating system
manages processes and use deception to hide malicious processes.

from the malware they are analysing. The research conducted in this work showed that the number of anti
forensic techniques covered by such plug-ins is much less than the number of techniques that are available to be
implemented by malware. In addition, this research shows that although the plug-ins successfully hides the
debugger or disassembler, the tools do not provide any information to the analyst about having detected the use
of analysis avoidance techniques. This is significant for two major reasons. Firstly, because detection of the use
of anti-analysis techniques in software may be of assistance to a digital forensic investigator to show that
deception was used to hide malicious intent. Secondly, a false sense of security from using the plugins may lead
to the analyst not conducting a thorough analysis of the malware and being the resultant subject of deception.
This suggests a deficiency in existing tools that the analyst must be aware of.
A variety of scripting languages and Application Programming Interfaces (API) exist to extend popular
debuggers in order to successfully detect and mitigate the use of anti-analysis techniques. Given the claim by
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this research that existing plugins have severe limitations due to their lack of coverage of anti-analysis
techniques and lack of logging functionality to show discovery of the use of these techniques, scripting of
debuggers is an essential skill required for analysing malicious software.

Detection and Mitigation Techniques can be Effective
This research shows that the use of scripting for debuggers and disassemblers extends the functionality of the
tools to facilitate the detection and mitigation of analysis avoidance techniques employed by malware. This
research recommends that the development of debugger and disassembly scripting skills is requisite to being
able to detect and counter analysis avoidance techniques of malware. This contribution exists at the current front
line of research in the detection of malware.
The detection of anti-analysis techniques features far less in the literature than does the discussion of the
employment of anti-analysis techniques. Detection of anti-analysis techniques in code would not only assist the
analyst in investigation of malicious intent and the discovery of any attempts at deception, it also appears that
detection of anti-analysis techniques may be a very good indicator that the code has a malicious intent. That is
not to say that the use of anti-analysis techniques does not have a place in protecting the intellectual property of
legitimate software. However, this research shows that malware invariably incorporates anti-analysis techniques
and that detection of such techniques may warrant further investigation, even if the detailed analysis may have to
be conducted by a specialist.

An Extensive Knowledge Domain is Required
A significant body of knowledge is required to obtain detailed information from manual analysis in order to
determine the in-depth functionality of the malware (Valli & Brand, 2008). A short, non-exhaustive, requisite
skills list for the analysis of Windows-based malware analysis indicated by Valli & Brand could include:
Assembly language programming ability
Program debugging skills
Static code analysis techniques
Dynamic code analysis techniques
Windows Applications Programming Interface (API) programming skills
Windows Operating System internals knowledge
Computer networking and network programming skills
Malware techniques knowledge
Reverse engineering skills
Knowledge of analysis avoidance techniques
This research shows that the extent of knowledge required to analyse malware is extensive. A proposed Malware
Analysis Body of Knowledge (MABOK) was initiated by the conduct of this research where the treatment of
anti-analysis techniques is a key and vital component. The reality is, that because malware extensively
incorporates anti-analysis techniques, detailed analysis cannot start until the anti-analysis techniques are
mitigated.

Packers and Protectors are Extensively used by Malware
Run time packers are utilised by network based malware to compress malware and to act as a counter measure to
signature based AV software via obfuscation (Sun, Ebringer, & Boztas, 2008). The packed malware has to be
unpacked before an investigator or specialist can perform a detailed static analysis, because packed malware
obfuscates the malware code. Knowledge of the packer used assists in the process of unpacking because the
appropriate unpacking methodology can be employed to unpack it. Software tools are available that attempt to
determine the name of the packer that was used to pack the malware by signature recognition. This research
showed that two popular packer detectors that were used by this researcher did not agree on the names of any of
the packers that were used. This is significant because it indicates uncertainty could be associated with the
determined packer signatures and that more in depth, manual analysis is required to validate the type of packing
that was employed. Generally, once the packer signature has been determined, the appropriate algorithm can be
applied to unpack the malware to arrive at the original entry point (OEP), which is the original entry point of the
program before it was packed. However, if conflicting packer signatures are determined from two or more
packer signature detectors, both algorithms may have to be applied to arrive at the OEP, and there is no
guarantee that either one of them is correct without validation from a manual analysis perspective. This has
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implications with respect to the consumption of the time available to the analyst and certainly benefits the
malware writer whose objective is to prevent or hinder analysis of the malicious code.
The line of this research was extended to examine entropy (randomness) measurements of the packed malware
as a method of determining if the collected malware was packed or not. Entropy measurements are shown in this
research to be a very good indicator that malware has been packed.

Derivation of an Appropriate Analysis Methodology
A review of the literature on malware analysis methodologies found that the most effective methodologies take
the presence of analysis avoidance techniques into account (Skoudis & Zeltser, 2004; Zeltser, 2007). Zelter
(2007) presents an incremental, static and dynamic spiral analysis methodology for analysing malware which
additionally moulds the analysis environment as understanding of the malware is attained. A simple example of
Zelter’s methodology begins by performing a basic static analysis of the malware specimen, such as performing
a virus scan, determining the type of file and the type of packer used. This is followed by setting up a suitable
environment to examine the specimen in, such as Windows XP in a virtual machine if the type of malware was a
Microsoft Windows executable file. This is followed by running the malware and observing its behaviour with
dynamic analysis tools. Using knowledge gained from this phase, static analysis can then be used to focus on
sections of code or data of interest. This spiral based approach continues until as much detail on the malware has
extracted as required. This methodology was adapted to include the detection and mitigation of anti-analysis
techniques in each phase.
Figure 3 depicts a proposed analysis methodology for analysing malware that facilitates the discovery and
mitigation of analysis avoidance techniques as an extension to Zelter’s analysis methodology. The advantage of
this adapted methodology is that when anti forensic techniques are encountered, they can be detected and
mitigated before proceeding with the analysis. The analysis begins with a preliminary static analysis, such as
determination of the file type of the malicious executable under investigation, and an appropriate static analysis
environment is then established. Anti-analysis techniques can be categorized to target static and dynamic
analysis techniques, therefore, it makes sense to focus on detecting and mitigating static analysis avoidance
techniques before conducting a detailed static analysis. This phase is followed by tailoring an appropriate
dynamic analysis environment using any relevant information found by the previous phase. Any dynamic
analysis avoidance techniques are then detected and mitigated before proceeding with a more detailed dynamic
analysis. The information discovered during this cycle is then used as input to determine how to proceed with the
next static analysis phase. This spiral cycle continues until enough satisfactory information about the malware
has been extracted.
Preliminary Static Analysis

Detailed Dynamic Analysis

Tailor Static Analysis
Environment

Detect and Mitigate Dynamic
Analysis Avoidance
Technique

Detect and Mitigate Static
Analysis Avoidance
Technique

Tailor Dynamic Analysis
Environment

Detailed Static Analysis

Preliminary Dynamic Analysis

Figure 3: An extension of Zelters spiral analysis methodology proposed as a means of analysing and classifying
avoidance techniques employed by malware.
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An Alternate Paradigm for Malware Detection is Required
Anti-virus software typically uses signature matching and recognition of heuristics to detect malware. This
approach generally requires the malware to have been collected from targeted or victim computers, subsequently
analysed, and signatures downloaded to client computers to approach any level of effectiveness. Significant
damage to computers could occur between the time of collection and the point at which signature updates have
been performed. In addition, it is very unlikely that AV software will detect custom malware that has not been
set loose on the internet, but targeted against an individual or a corporation, because it will not have been
analyzed and a signature will not have been obtained by an AV company. Anti-virus software that uses this
approach is seen to be fighting a losing battle, both in the literature and from observations made during this
research (Mila Dalla, Mihai, Somesh, & Saumya, 2008; Zhou & Meador Inge, 2008). This research supports a
proposal for a new paradigm for malware detection. In particular, this research proposes that detection of
deception and anti-analysis techniques in software should flag the software as potentially malicious and delegate
for further in depth analysis or removal.

AVENUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
A number of avenues exist for furthering this research, with suggestions to include plugin development for
analysis tools, collation of analysis avoidance techniques, improved packer and protector identification and a
new paradigm for malware detection. These suggestions are expanded upon in the following sub sections.

Plugin Development
This research noted that plugins such as IDAStealth and OllyAdvanced provide coverage for only a subset of
analysis avoidance techniques. A limitation of the existing plugins is that their focus is on hiding the debugger
and do not have the ability at this point in time to detect and log the use of anti-analysis techniques. Additional
research could be conducted on extending the coverage of techniques of such plugins. The detection and logging
of techniques as they are discovered during forensic analysis of malware could assist in the collection of
evidence suitable for a court of law.

Collation of Analysis Avoidance Techniques
This research revealed an extensive range of analysis avoidance techniques that is currently distributed amongst
research papers, hacking, and reverse engineering web sites. Detection and mitigation techniques are not heavily
represented in academic literature, as compared to the information available on hacking and reverse engineering
sites. A very useful contribution to the field of malware analysis research could be to collate analysis avoidance
techniques, together with their corresponding detection and mitigation techniques into a central library and to
further develop an encompassing taxonomy.

Improved Packer Signature Detection
Packer signature detection has been revealed in this research to be an area that requires further and most likely,
continual research. This also extends to the area of unpacking packed malware as well, because malware can use
multiple packers not only from a sequential sense. For example, pack the entire malware specimen with packer
A and then pack the result with packer B, but firstly pack sections of code with packer A and then pack the result
with packer B. This last scenario is another deception technique that is generally only uncovered once manual
analysis is conducted. It is possible that an automated analysis process may miss the second, or subsequent
iterations, of packing. This remains an area of research that lacks published work, and should be a focus for
future research in order to increase levels of detection in general.

A New Paradigm for Malware Detection
This research has shown AV software to be less than fully effective at detecting malware. Research could
continue into investigating a new paradigm for malware detection, particularly by detecting the use of antianalysis techniques in scanned software and flagging it for more detailed attention.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Malware can use anti-forensic techniques and use deception to hide its real purpose whilst being analysed. If it
does not perform any malicious action while it is being analysed, it may be accepted on the system as being safe,
or excluded from the evidence collection process. Once free from analysis, the malware can perform its original,
malicious objective.
Some considerations must be made in order to closely analyse malware. Firstly, totally relying on AV software
to classify the malware could be a mistake because signature based detection is far from ideal as it is unlikely to
recognise customised malware that has not been analysed before. This leads to the necessity of the digital
forensic analyst to analyse the malware manually. It must be noted that a significant number of anti-analysis
techniques exist covering the entire spectrum of the computational mechanics of computers. These techniques
are very effective at hindering analysis, can be compounded by additional factors, and include deficiencies in
analysis tools that do not cover the number of anti-analysis techniques that are available to be employed.
Analysis is made more difficult by the number of packers and protectors that malware can use. This makes it
hard because a typical technique to unpack the malware is to use known algorithms to let the malware unpack
itself to reach the OEP. In doing so, control is given to the malware and an opportunity exists for the malware to
detect that it is being analysed and provides the opportunity of the malware to employ deception. An additional
consideration is that a very extensive knowledge of programming, debugging and operating system internals is
required that arguably exceeds the level attained even by competent software engineers. On the positive side, the
use of anti-analysis techniques can be detected and mitigated if significant analysis skills have been attained.
This can be assisted by using an appropriate methodology where static and dynamic methods are combined in
such a way that the view of the malware transitions from a high level of detail down, to a low level of detail,
mitigating the anti-analysis techniques as analysis progresses in a spiral analysis methodology. Although
legitimate software uses anti-analysis techniques to protect itself from reverse engineers, malware is almost
certain to use anti-analysis techniques. So much so, the detection of the use of anti-analysis techniques may be a
very good indicator of the presence of malware.
As suggested previously, if more work is not undertaken in this field, there are a number of adverse
consequences. It is possible that the use of these anti-forensic techniques will not only make the job of the
forensic investigator difficult, there is also the potential to render anti-virus software next to useless as a means
of protecting computers and networks.
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